Cornell Law Review
Volume 10
Issue 1 December 1924

Article 2

Logical Method and Law
John Dewey

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 Cornell L. Rev. 17 (1924)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol10/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Logical Method and Law
Jom DEWEYt

Human conduct, broadly viewed, falls into two sorts: Particular
cases overlap, but the difference is discernible on any large scale
consideration of conduct. Sometimes human beings act with a minimum of foresight, without examination of what they are doing and of
probable consequences. They act not upon deliberation but from
routine, instinct, the direct pressure of appetite, or a blind 'hunch.'
It would be a mistake to suppose that such behavior is always inefficient or unsuccessful. When we do not like it, we condemn it as
capricious, arbitrary, careless, negligent. But in other cases, we
praise the marvellous rectitude of instinct or intuition; we are inclined to accept the offhand appraisal of an expert in preference to
elaborately calculated conclusions of a man who is ill-informed.
There is the old story of the layman who was appointed to a position
in India where he would have to pass in his official capacity on
various matters in controversy between natives. Upon consulting a
legal friend, he was told to use his common-sense and announce his
decisions firmly; in the majority of cases his natural decision as to
what was fair and reasonable would suffice. But, his friend added:
"Never try to give reasons, for they will usually be wrong."
In the other sort of case, action follows upon a decision, and the
decision is the outcome of inquiry, comparison of alternatives, weighing of facts; deliberation or thinking has intervened. Considerations
which have weight in reaching the conclusion as to what is to be done,
or which are employed to justify it when it is questioned, are called
'reasons.' If they are stated in sufficiently general terms they are
'principles.' When the operation is formulated in a compact way,
the decision is called a conclusion, and the considerations which led
up to it are called the premises. Decisions of the first type may be
reasonable: that is, they may be adapted to good results; those of
the second type are reasoned or rational, increasingly so, in the degree of care and thoroughness with which inquiry has been conducted
and the order in which connections have been established between the
considerations dealt with.
Now I define logical theory as an account of the procedures followed
in reaching decisions of the second type, in those cases in which subsetProfessor of Philosophy, Columbia University.
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quent experience shows that they were the best which could have
been used under the conditions. This definition would be questioned
by many authorities, and it is only fair to say that it does not represent
the orthodox or the prevailing view. But it is stated at the outset so
that the reader may be aware of the conception of logic which underlies the following discussion. If we take an objection which will be
brought against this conception by adherents of the traditional notion,
it will serve to clarify its meaning. It will be said that the definition
restricts thinking to the processes antecedent to making a decision
or a deliberate choice; and, thereby, in confining logical procedure to
practical matters, fails to take even a glance at those cases in which
true logical method is best exemplified: namely, scientific, especially
mathematical, subjects.
A partial answer to this objection is that the especial topic of our
present discussion is logical method in legal reasoning and judicial
decision, and that such cases at least are similar in general type to
decisions made by engineers, merchants, physicians, bankers, etc., in
the pursuit of their callings. In law we are certainly concerned with
the necessity of settling upon a course of action to be pursued, giving
judgment of one sort or another in favor of adoption of one mode of
conduct and against another. But the scope of the position taken will
appear more clearly if we do not content ourselves with this ad hoc
reply.
If we consider the procedure of the mathematician or of any man
of science, as it concretely occurs, instead of considering simply the
relations of consistent implication which subsist between the propositions in which his finally approved conclusions are set forth, we find
that he, as well as an intelligent farmer or business man or physician,
is constantly engaged in making decisions; and that in order to make
them wisely he summons before his mental gaze various considerations,
and accepts and rejects them with a view to making his decision as
rational as possible. The concrete subject with which he deals, the
material he investigates, accepts, rejects, employs in reaching and
justifying his decision, is different from that of farmer, lawyer, or
merchant, but the course of the operation, the form of the procedure,
is similar. The scientific man has the advantage of working under
much more narrowly and exactly controlled conditions, with the aid
of symbols artfully devised to protect his procedure. For that reason
it is natural and proper that we should, in our formal treatises, take
operations of this type as standards and models, and should treat
ordinary 'practical' reasonings leading up to decisions as to what is
to be done as only approximations. But every thinker, as an investi-
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gator, mathematician, or physicist as well as 'practical man,' thinks
in order to determine his decisions and conduct-his conduct as a
specialized agent working in a carefully delimited field.
It may be replied, of course, that this is an arbitrary notion of logic,
and that in reality logic is an affair of the relations and orders of
relations which subsist between propositions which constitute the
accepted subject-matter of a science; that relations are independent
of operations of inquiry and of reaching conclusions or decisions. I
shall not stop to try to controvert this position, but shall use it to
point the essential difference between it and the position taken in
this article. According to the latter, logical systematization with a
view to the utmost generality and consistency of propositions is indispensable but is not ultimate. It is an instrumentality, not an end.
It is a means of improving, facilitating, clarifying the inquiry that
leads up to concrete decisions; primarily that particular inquiry which
has just been engaged in, but secondarily, and of greater ultimate
importance, other inquiries directed at making other decisions in similar fields. And here at least I may fall back for confirmation upon the
special theme of law. It is most important that rules of law should
form as coherent generalized logical systems as possible. But these
logical systematizations of law in any field, whether of crime, contracts, or torts, with their reduction of a multitude of decisions to a
few general principles that are logically consistent with one another
while it may be an end in itself for a particular student, is clearly in
last resort subservient to the economical and effective reaching of
decisions in particular cases.
It follows that logic is ultimately an empirical and concrete discipline. Men first employ certain ways of investigating, and of collecting, recording and using data in reaching conclusions, in making
decisions; they draw inferences and make their checks and tests in
various ways. These different ways constitute the empirical raw
material of logical theory. The latter thus comes into existence
without any conscious thought of logic, just as forms of speech take
place without conscious reference to rules of syntax or of rhetorical
propriety. But it is gradually learned that some methods which are
used work better than others. Some yield conclusions that do not
stand the test of further situations; they produce conflicts and confusion; decisions dependent upon them have to be retracted or revised.
Other methods are found to yield conclusions which are available in
subsequent inquiries as well as confirmed by them. There first occurs
a kind of natural selection of the methods which afford the better
type of conclusion, better for subsequent usage, just as happens in
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the development of rules for conducting any art. Afterwards the
methods are themselves studied critically. Successful ones are not
only selected and collated, but the causes of their effective operation
are discovered. Thus logical theory becomes scientific.
The bearing of the conception of logic which is here advanced upon
legal thinking and decisions may be brought out by examining the
apparent disparity which exists between actual legal development and
the strict requirements of logical theory. Justice Holmes has generalized the situation by saying that "the whole outline of the law is the
resultant of a conflict at every point between logic and good sensethe one striving to work fiction out to consistent results, the other
restraining and at last overcoming that effort when the results become
too manifestly unjust."'I This statement he substantiates by a
thorough examination of the development of certain legal notions.
Upon its surface, such a statement implies a different view of the
nature of logic than that stated. It implies that logic is not themethod
of good sense, that it has as it were a substance and life of its own
which conflicts with the requirements of good decisions with respect
to concrete subject-matters. The difference, however, is largely verbal. What Justice Holmes terms logic is formal consistency, consistency of concepts with one another irrespective of the consequences of
their application to concrete matters-of-fact. We might state the
fact by saying that concepts once developed have a kind of intrinsic
inertia on their own account; once developed the law of habit applies
to them. It is practically economical to use a concept ready at hand
rather than to take time and trouble and effort to change it or to
devise a new one. The use of prior ready-made and familiar concepts
also give rise to a sense of stability, of guarantee against sudden and
arbitrary changes of the rules which determine the consequences
which legally attend acts. It is the nature of any concept, as it is of
any habit to change more slowly than do the concrete circumstances
with reference to which it is employed. Experience shows that the
relative fixity of concepts affords men with a specious sense of protection, of assurance against the troublesome flux of events. Thus
Justice Holmes says, "The language of judicial decision is mainly the
language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that
longing for certainty and for repose which is'in every human mind.
But certainty generally is an illusion. ' 2 From the view of logical
method here set forth, however, the undoubted facts which Justice
Holmes has in mind do not concern logic but rather certain tendencies
'Collected Legal Papers, p. 50.
2lud., p. 18i.

LOGICAL METHOD AND LAW
of the human creatures who use logic; tendencies which a sound logic
will guard against. For they spring from the momentum of habit
once forced, and express the effect of habit upon our feelings of ease
and stability-feelings which have little to do with the actual facts of
the case.
However this is only part of the story. The rest of the story is
brought to light in some other passages of Justice Holmes. "The
actual life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the times, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more
to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed." 3 In other words, Justice Holmes is thinking of logic
as equivalent with the syllogism, as he is quite entitled to do in accord
with the orthodox tradition. From the standpoint of the syllogism
as the logical model which was made current by scholasticism there
is an antithesis between experience and logic, between logic and good
sense. For the philosophy embodied in the formal theory of the
syllogism asserted that thought or reason has fixed forms of its own,
anterior to and independent of concrete subject-matters, .and to
which the latter have to be adapted whether or no. This defines the
negative aspect of this discussion; and it shows by contrast the need
of another kind of logic which shall reduce the influence of habit,
and shall facilitate the use of good sense regarding matters of social
consequence.
In other words, there are different logics in use. One of these, the
one which has had greatest historic currency and exercised greatest
influence on legal decisions, is that of the syllogism. To this logic
the strictures of Justice Holmes apply in full force. For it purports
to be a logic of rigid demonstration, not of search and discovery.
It claims to be a logic of fixed forms, rather than of methods of
reaching intelligent decisions in concrete situations, or of methods
employed in adjusting disputed issues in behalf of the public and enduringinterest. Those ignorant of formal logic, the logic of the abstract
relations of ready-made conceptions to one another, have at least
heard of the standard syllogism: All men are mortal; Scorates is a
man; therefore, he is mortal. This is offered as the model of all proof
or demonstration. It implies that what we need and must procure is
first a fixed general principle, the so-called major premise, such as
'all men are mortal;' then in the second place, a fact which belongs
intrinsically and obviously to a class of things to which the general
3

The Common Law, p. i.
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principle applies: Socrates is a man. Then the conclusion automatically follows: Socrates is mortal. According to this model every
demonstrative or strictly logical conclusion 'subsumes' a particular
under an appropriate universal. It implies the prior and given
existence of particulars and universals.
It thus implies that for every possible case which may arise, there
is a fixed antecedent rule already at hand; that the case in question
is either simple and unambiguous, or is resolvable by direct inspection
into a collection of simple and indubitable facts, such as, 'Socrates is
a man.' It thus tends, when it is accepted, to produce and confirm
what Professor Pound has called mechanical jurisprudence; it
flatters that longing for certainty of which Justice Holmes speaks; it
reinforces those inert factors in human nature which make men hug
as long as possible any idea which has once gained lodgment in the
mind.
In a certain sense it is foolish to criticise the model supplied by
the syllogism. The statements made about men and Socrates are
obviously true, and the connection between them is undoubted. The
trouble is that while the syllogism sets forth the results of thinking,
it has nothing to do with the operation of thinking. Take the case of
Socrates being tried before the Athenian citizens, and the thinking
which had to be done to reach a decision. Certainly the issue was
not whether Socrates was mortal; the point was whether this mortality would or should occur at a specified date and in a specified way.
Now that is just what does not and cannot follow from a general
principle or a major premise. Again to quote Justice Holmes, "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." No concrete proposition, that is to say one with material dated in time and placed in
space, follows from any general statements or from any connection
between them.
If we trust to an experimental logic, we find that general principles
emerge as statements of generic ways in which it has been found helpful
to treat concrete cases. The real force of the proposition that all
men are mortal is found in the expectancy tables of insurance companies, which with their accompanying rates show how it is prudent
and socially useful to deal with human mortality. The 'universal'
stated in the major premise is not outside of and antecedent to particular cases; neither is it a selection of something found in a variety
of cases. It is an indication of a single way of treating cases for certain
purposes or consequences in spite of their diversity. Hence its meaning and worth are subject to inquiry and revision in view of what
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happens, what the consequences are, when it is used as a method of
treatment.
As a matter of fact, men do not begin thinking with premises.
They begin with some complicated and confused case, apparently
admitting of alternative modes of treatment and solution. Premises
only gradually emerge from analysis of the total situation. The
problem is not to draw a conclusion from given premises; that can
best be done by a piece of inanimate machinery by fingering a keyboard. The problem is to find statements, of general principle and of
particular fact, which are worthy to serve as premises. As matter
of actual fact, we generally begin with some vague anticipation of a
conclusion (or at least of alternative conclusions), and then we look
around for principles and data which will substantiate it or which
will enable us to choose intelligently between rival conclusions. No
lawyer ever thought out the case of a client in terms of the syllogism.
He begins with a conclusion which he intends to reach, favorable
to his client of course, and then analyzes the facts of the situation to
find material out of which to construct a favorable statement of facts,
to form a minor premise. At the same time he goes over recorded
cases to find rules of law employed in cases which can be presented
as similar, rules which will substantiate a certain way of looking at
and interpreting the facts. And as his acquaintance with rules of law
judged applicable widens, he probably alters perspective and emphasis
in selection of the facts which are to form his evidential data. And
as he learns more of the facts of the case he may modify his selection
of rules of law upon which he bases his case.
I do not for a moment set up this procedure as a model of scientific
method; it is too precommitted to the establishment of a particular
and partisan conclusion to serve as such a model. But it does illustrate, in spite of this deficiency, the particular point which is being
made here: namely, that thinking actually sets out from a more or
less confused situation, which is vague and ambiguous with respect to
the conclusion it indicates, and that the formation of both major
premise and minor proceed tentatively and correlatively in the course
ofanalysisof this situation and of prior rules. As soon as acceptable
premises are given and of course the judge and jury have eventually
to do with their becoming accepted-and the conclusion is also given.
In strict logic, the conclusion does not follow from premises; conclusions and premises are two ways of stating the same thing. Thinking may be defined either as a development of premises or development of a conclusion; as far as it is one operation it is the other.
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Courts not only reach decisions; they expound them, and the
exposition must state justifying reasons. The mental operations
therein involved are somewhat different from those involved in
arriving at a conclusion. The logic of exposition is different from that
of search and inquiry. In the latter, the situation as it exists is more
or less doubtful, indeterminate, and problematic with respect to what
it signifies. It unfolds itself gradually and is susceptible of dramatic
surprise; at all events it has, for the time being, two sides. Exposition
implies that a definitive solution is reached, that the situation is now
determinate with respect to its legal implication. Its purpose is to
set forth grounds for the decisionreached so that it willnot appear as an
arbitrary dictum, and so that it will indicate a rule for dealing with
similar cases in the future. It is highly probable that the need of
justifying to others conclusions reached and decisions made has been
the chief cause of the origin and development of logical operations
in the precise sense; of abstraction, generalization, regard for consistency of implications. It is quite conceivable that if fo one had
ever had to account to others for his decisions, logical operations
would never have developed, but men would use exclusively methods
of inarticulate intuition and impression, feeling; so that only after
considerable experience in accounting for their decisions to others
who demanded a reason, or exculpation, and were not satisfied till
they got it, did men begin to give an account to themselves of the
process of reaching a conclusion in a justified way. However this
may be, it is certain that in judicial decisions the only alternative to
arbitrary dicta, accepted by the parties to a controversy only because
of the authority or prestige of the judge, is a rational statement which
formulates grounds and exposes connecting or logical links.
It is at this point that the chief stimulus and temptation to mechanical logic and abstract use of formal concepts come in. Just
because the personal element cannot be wholly excluded, while at the
same time the decision must assume as nearly as possible animpersonal,
objective, rational form, the temptation is to surrender the vital logic
which has actually yielded the conclusion and to substitute for it
forms of speech which are rigorous in appearance and which give an
illusion of certitude.
Another moving force is the undoubted need for the maximum
possible of stability and regularity of expectation in determining
courses of conduct. Men need to know the legal consequences which
society through the courts will attach to their specific transactions,
the liabilities they are assuming, the fruits they may count upon in
entering upon a given course of action.
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This is a legitimate requirement from the standpoint of the interests
of the community and of particular individuals. Enormous confusion
has resulted, however, from confusion of theoretical certainty and
practical certainty. There is a wide gap separating the reasonable
proposition that judicial decisions should possess the maxinum
possible regularity in order to enable persons in planning their conduct to foresee the legal import of their acts, and the absurd because
impossible proposition that every decision should flow with formal
logical necessity from antecedently known premises. To attain
the former result there are required general principles of interpreting
cases-rules of law-and procedures of pleading and trying cases
which do not alter arbitrarily. But principles of interpretation do
not signify rules so rigid that they can be stated once for all and
then be literally and mechanically adhered to. For the situations to
which they are to be applied do not literally repeat one another in
all details, and questions of degree of this factor or that have the chief
weight in" determining which general rule will be employed to judge
the situation in question. A large part of what has been asserted
concerning the necessity of absolutely uniform and immutable antecedent rules of law is in effect an attemptto evade thereally important
issue of finding and employing rules of law, substantive and procedural,
which will actually secure to the members of the community a reasonable measure of practical certainty of expectation in framing their
courses of conduct. The mechanical ease of the court in disposing of
cases and not the actual security of agents is the real cause, for example,
of making rules of pleading hard and fast. The result introduces an
unnecessary element of gamble into the behavior of those seeking
settlement of disputes. while it affords to the judges only that
factitious ease and simplicity which is supplied by any routine habit
of action. It substitutes a mechanical procedure for the need of
analytic thought.
There is of course every reason why rules of law should be as
regular and as definite as possible. But the amount and kind of antecedent assurance which is actually attainable is a matter of fact, not
of form. It is large wherever social conditions are pretty uniform,
and when industry, commerce, transportation, etc., move in the
channels of old customs. It is much less wherever invention is active
and when new devices in business and communication bring about
new forms of human relationship. Thus the use of power machinery
radically modifies the old terms of association of master and servant
and fellow servants; rapid transportation brings into general use
commercial bills of lading; mass production engenders organization
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of laborers and collective bargaining; industrial conditions favor
concentration of capital. In part legislation endeavors to reshape
old rules of law to make them applicable to new conditions. But
statutes have never kept up with the variety and subtlety of social
change. They cannot at the very best avoid some ambiguity, which
is due not only to carelessness but also to the intrinsic impossibility
of foreseeing all possible circumstances, since without such foresight
definitions must be vague and classifications indeterminate. Hence
to claim that old forms are ready at hand that cover every case and
that may be applied by formal syllogizing is to pretend to a certainty
and regularity which cannot exist in fact. The effect of the pretension
is to increase practical uncertainty and social instability. Justbecause
circumstances are really novel and not covered by old rules, it is a
gamble which old rule will be declared regulative of a particular case,
so that shrewd and enterprising men are encouraged to sail close to the
wind and trust to ingenious lawyers to find some rule under which
they can get off scot free.
The facts involved in this discussion are commonplace and they
are not offered as presenting anything original or novel. What we
are concerned with is their bearing upon the logic of judicial decisions.
For the implications are more revolutionary than they might at first
seem to be. They indicate either that logic must be abandoned or
that it must be a logic relative to consequences ratherthan to antecedents,
a logic of prediction of probabilities rather than one of deduction of
certainties. For the purposes of a logic of inquiry into probable
consequences, general principles can only be tools justified by the
work they do. They are means of intellectual survey, analysis, and
insight into the factors of the situation to be dealt with. Like other
tools they must be modified when they are applied to new conditions
and new results have to be achieved. Here is where the great practical
evil of the doctrine of immutable and necessary antecedent rules comes
in. It sanctifies the old; adherence to it in practise constantly widens
the gap between current social conditions and the principles used by
the courts. The effect is to breed irritation, disrespect for law, together with virtual alliance between the judiciary and entrenched
interests that correspond most nearly to the conditions under which
the rules of law were previously laid down.
Failure to recognize that general legal rules and principles are
working hypotheses, needing to be constantly tested by the way in
which they work out in application to concrete situations, explains
the otherwise paradoxical fact that the slogans of the liberalism of
one period often become the bulwarks of reaction in a subsequent era.
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There was a time in the eighteenth century when the great social need
was emancipation of industry and trade from a multitude of restrictions which held over from the feudal estate of Europe. Adapted
well enough to the localized and fixed conditions of that earlier age,
they became hindrances and annoyances as the effects of methods, use
of coal and steam, showed themselves. The movement of emancipation
expressed itself in principles of liberty in use of property, and freedom
of contract, which were embodied in a mass of legal decisions. But
the absolutisti¢ logic of rigid syllogistic forms infected these ideas.
It was soon forgotten that they were relative to analysis of existing
situations in order to secure orderly methods in behalf of economic
social welfare. Thus these principles became in turn so rigid as to be
almost as socially obstructive as "immutable" feudal laws had been
in their day.
That the remarks which have been made, commonplace as they
are in themselves, have a profound practical import may also be seen
in the present reaction against the individualistic formulae of an older
liberalism. The last thirty yearshas seen an intermittent tendency in
the direction of legislation, and to a less extent of judicial decision,
towards what is vaguely known as "social justice," toward formulae
of a collectivistic character. Now it is quite possible that the newer
rules maybe needed and useful at a certain juncture, and yet that they
may also become harmful and socially obstructive if they are hardened
into absolute and fixed antecedent premises. But if they are conceived as tools to be adapted to the conditions in which they are
employed rather than as absolute and intrinsic "principles," attention
will go to the facts of social life, and the rules will not be allowed to
engross attention and become absolute truths to be mantained intact
at all costs. Otherwise we shall in the end merely have substituted
one set of formally absolute and immutable syllogistic premises for
another set.
If we recur then to our introductory conception that logic is really
a theory about empirical phenomena, subject to growth and improvement like any other empirical discipline, we recur to it withan added
conviction: namely, that the issueis not a purely speculative one, but
implies consequences vastly significant for practise. I should indeed
not hesitate to assert that the sanctification- of ready-made antecedent universal principles as methods of thinking is the chief obstacle
to the kind of thinking which is the indispensable prerequisite of
steady, secure and intelligent social reforms in general and social advance by means of law in particular. If this be so infiltration into law
of a more experimental and flexible logic is a social as well as an
intellectual need.

